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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Darrell Wyatt Morris appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of
his petition for post-conviction relief.

Specifically, he challenges the district

court's denial of his motion to appoint counsel.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts of Morris' underlying
convictions :
Morris appeals from the judgments of conviction in two cases that
were consolidated for purposes of sentencing . In case number
35541 , Morris was charged with eluding a police officer, I.C. § 491401 (2)(a), and pursuant to a plea agreement, pied guilty to the
charge and the state agreed to dismiss a separate case and to
remand yet another case as a misdemeanor. While awaiting
sentencing on the eluding charge, Morris was charged with and
pied guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), I.C. §§
18-8004, 18-8005(5), in case number 35542. The district court
sentenced Morris to a unified term of five years , with three years
determinate, on the eluding charge and to a consecutive unified
term of ten years , with three years determinate, on the DUI . Morris
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence in
case number 35542 , which the district court denied.
Morris
appeals from his judgments of conviction and sentences,
contending that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
consider his mental illness and alternatively by imposing excessive
sentences.
State v. Morris, Docket Nos. 35541 /35542 , 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 482
(Idaho App., May 29, 2009), pp.1-2 . The Court affirmed Morris's convictions and
sentences. Id.
Morris timely filed a pro se "Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction
Relief." (R., pp .3-6.) Morris asserted that he received ineffective assistance of

1

counsel at sentencing, claiming his counsel failed to effectively present mitigating
factors and to "object to objectable issues ," and also promised Morris that his
cases would be transferred to Mental Health Court and he would be placed on
probation . (R., pp .4-5 .)
The district court denied Morris's motion for counsel and issued notice of
its intent to dismiss Morris's petition .

(R., pp .16-19.)

After setting forth the

standard for appointment of post-conviction counsel articulated in Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) , and the standard for evaluating an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as articulated in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), the district court found that Morris's claims "are so patently
frivolous that they could not be developed into viable claims even with the
assistance of counsel."

(R., p.18.)

Specifically , the district court found that

Morris had "fail[ed) to describe any such evidence or objections [that counsel
failed to present or make]; nor [did) he show how he was prejudiced or how this
evidence would have resulted in a different outcome.

Petitioner's vague and

unsupported statements and incomplete claims do not form the basis for a
cognizable claim for post conviction relief." (R., p.17 (internal citations omitted).)
The district court gave Morris twenty days "to correct the deficiencies in his
claims ." (Id.)
Morris's response did not include any affidavits or other admissible
evidence.
following

(R., pp.25-32.)
allegations

Morris did, however, "attempt to expound on his

of ineffective

assistance
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of counsel."

(R.,

p.26.)

Specifically, for purposes of the instant appeal, Morris expounded on his claim
that his trial counsel "did not object to objectable issues":
Counsel did not object to the Court's Mental Health Evaluation
because of the fact it was administered by a Department of Health
and Welfare "counselor" during a twenty (20) minute visit at the
County Jail, and not a licensed physician.
(R., p.27.) Morris also claimed that his trial counsel did not submit for sentencing
"several medical reports and record from the Social Security Administration, All
Seasons Mental Health, lntermountain Hospital, and Saint Alphonsus Mental
Health Center which ... would [have] contradicted the Court's Mental Health
Evaluation." (Id.) As to his prejudice, Morris argued "[h]ad this honorable Court
known of the Petitioner's true mental health history, it would [have] had to
consider that as well," and "could have considered treatment and rehabilitation
instead of only incarceration." (Id.)
Upon the state's motion (R., pp.33-34), the district court issued its "Order
Unsealing and Authorizing Release of Presentence Investigation Report and I.C.
§ 19-2524 Evaluations" (R., pp.35-36).

The district court also granted Morris's

"Motion to Unseal and Release All Medical Reports in Cases CR-MD-2008001589 and CR-FE-2008-00077 41," by which Morris sought the release of his
medical records by his trial counsel and which, he claimed, were not provided to
the court at sentencing. (R., pp.37-38, 39.)
In the same order by which it granted Morris's request for the release of
his medical records, the district court considered Morris's response to its
previous order denying counsel and notice of intent to dismiss Morris's petition.
(R., pp.39-44 ("Order Denying Counsel and Notice of Intent to Dismiss").)
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The district court addressed Morris's first claim, that his trial counsel failed
to provide the sentencing court wrth his medical records from the Social Security
Administration, All Seasons Mental Health, lntermountain Hospital and Saint
Alphonsus Mental Health Center. (R., pp.39-40.) The district court reviewed the
record below and noted:
[T]he file clearly shows that the Court reviewed multiple mental
health related reports, including those listed by the Petitioner, and
took them into consideration prior to sentencing, including:
Discharge Summary from Vista Del Mar Hospital; Omega Health
Services Psychiatric Progress Notes; All Seasons Mental Health
Summary and Comprehensive Assessment; lntermountain Hospital
Discharge Summary, History and Physical, and Psychiatric
Evaluation; Saint Alphonsus Emergency Room Reports, Operative
Reports, Patient's Charts, Emergency Mental Health Consultation
Report, Radiology Reports, Inpatient Psychosocial Assessment,
Inpatient Progress Notes, and Patient Profile Report; Ada County
Paramedics Prehospital Patient Care Report; June 19, 2008 Mental
Health Report (I.C. § 19-2524); July 16, 2008 Substance Abuse
Report (I.C. § 19-2524).
(R., p.40.)

Accordingly, the district court found Morris's claim that his trial

counsel failed to provide these reports to the sentencing court was "clearly
contradicted by the record."

(Id.) "As such, the Court finds these allegations

remain patently frivolous and fail to warrant the appointment of counsel." (Id.)
The district court then addressed Morris's second claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel:
As to allegation two (2), that "counsel did not object to objectable
[sic] issues," Petitioner alleges (a) counsel failed to object to the
Mental Health Evaluation because it was not administered by a
licensed physician; and (b) counsel did not rebut the evaluation
with the contradictory medical reports. This second supportive
allegation is merely repetitive of Petitioner's first allegation and will
not be further addressed. As to the allegation that counsel failed to
object to the lack of a physician, this claim remains incomplete.
"Effective legal representation does not require that an attorney
4

object to admissible evidence."
Counsel had no reasonable
grounds on which to object. In Thorgaard v. State, the petitioner
sought relief based on an allegation that the staff psychologist was
not qualified to conduct the evaluation. However, [Thorgaard]
failed to show any error or inadequacy in the clinician's report, thus
failing to establish his burden of prejudice. Moreover, Petitioner
has neither alleged nor shown that the evaluation violated the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2524 or similar provisions.
Accordingly, because this claim ... is clearly contradicted by the
record, and because it is facially invalid, this claim remains
incomplete and patently frivolous.

(R. pp.40-41 (citations omitted).) The district court then considered Morris's third
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that trial counsel had promised he
would be placed on probation and his cases transferred to mental health court,
and determined that these claims, too, were contradicted by the record of the
change of plea hearing.

(R., pp.41-42.)

Finally, the district court found that

Morris's claim that he was unable to meaningfully participate in the proceedings
due to "the influence of mood stabilizing medications" was also contradicted by
the record. (R., p.42.)
Concluding that it "again finds Petitioner's claims are so patently frivolous
that they could not be developed into viable claims even with the assistance of
counsel," the district court denied Morris's request for post-conviction counsel,
and gave Morris an additional twenty (20) days to respond to avoid dismissal of
his petition.

(R., pp.42-43.)

More than four months later, having received no

response from Morris, the district court dismissed Morris's petition for postconviction relief. (R., pp.45-48.) Morris timely appealed. (R., pp.49-52.)
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ISSUE
Morris states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Morris' motion for
appointment of post-conviction counsel?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Morris failed to show error in the denial of his motion for the appointment of
post-conviction counsef?
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ARGUMENT
Morris Has Failed to Show That the District Court Erred By Denying His Request
For Post-Conviction Counsel

A.

Introduction
On appeal, Morris challenges only the district court's conclusion that he

did not raise the possibility of a valid claim with respect to his second claim, that
counsel failed to object to the mental health evaluation being conducted by a
counselor with the Department of Health and Welfare "and not a licensed
physician."

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

Morris contends that the district court

committed reversible error when it denied his motion for post-conviction counsel
because, he claims, he raised the possibility of a valid claim that counsel should
have objected to the mental health evaluation ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524
on grounds that it did not comply with the requirements for a presentence
psychological evaluation ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.9-10.) Application of the law to the facts before the district court, however,
supports its determination that Morris's petition and argument failed to establish
even the possibility of a valid claim. Morris has therefore failed to show that the
district court erred when it denied his motion for counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review And Legal Standards Applicable To A District Court's
Decision To Grant Or Deny A Request For The Appointment Of Counsel
In Post-Conviction Proceedings
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for courtappointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v.
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State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147
Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009).

1

The court's discretion is

not unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with

1

Morris recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
standard of review applicable to a district court's decision to grant or deny postconviction counsel is one of an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) He
argues, however, that "the 'possibility of a valid claim' standard that was coined
in Charboneau and reiterated in Swader is a strictly legal standard that leaves no
room for the district court to exercise its discretion" and, as such, "any decision
by a district court to deny a post-conviction petitioner counsel must be reviewed
de nova on appeal." (Id., pp.7-8 (citation omitted).) The state acknowledges
that, despite the legislature's use of the word "may" in I.C. § 19-4904, see also
1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 265, § 2, p.898 (changing "shall" to "may"), the
Idaho appellate courts have treated the standard for appointment of counsel as a
pure question of law instead of discretion. See, ~ . Melton v. State, 148 Idaho
339, 343, 223 P.3d 281, 285 (2009) (district court's failure to rule on request for
counsel did not necessitate reversal because the successive petition did not
raise the possibility of a valid claim); Swader, 143 Idaho at 653, 152 P.3d at 14
(question when district court fails to apply the correct legal standard governing
the request for appointed counsel is whether, applying the correct legal standard,
the motion for appointment of counsel should have been granted); Judd v. State,
148 Idaho 22, 25, 218 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted) (district
court's utilization of incorrect legal standard to deny a request for post-conviction
counsel does not necessitate reversal if, applying the correct standard, the
request for counsel would properly be denied). The state submits, however, that
whether the district court's decision in this case is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion or de nova, the ultimate inquiry is still the same, i.e., whether Morris
alleged facts showing the "possibility of valid claim."
8

the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164
P.3d 798, 809 (2007).
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau,
140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion
for appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t)his Court will not
set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792,
102 P.3d at 1111.

C.

Morris Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Denial Of His
Request For Counsel To Pursue The Frivolous Claims Alleged In His
Petition
Morris contended that counsel did not object to the mental health

evaluation being administered by a counselor with the Department of Health and
Welfare.

(R., p.27.) After correctly noting that "[e)ffective legal representation

does not require that an attorney object to admissible evidence," State v.
Aspeytia, 130 Idaho 12, 15, 936 P.2d 210, 213 (Ct. App. 1997), the district court
9

found that Morris "has neither alleged nor shown that the evaluation violated the
requirements of I .C. § 19-2524 or similar provisions." (R., p.41.) The district
court also analogized this case to Thorgaard v. State, 125 Idaho 901, 905, 876
P.2d 599, 603 (Ct. App. 1994), where the "petitioner failed to show any error or
inadequacy in the clinician's report, thus failing to establish his burden of
prejudice."

(R., p.41.)

The district court's ultimate conclusion that Morris's

contention did not raise the possibility of a valid claim is correct.
The mental health evaluation was ordered by the district court pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2524.

(See Supreme Court Case Nos. 35541 and 35542: "Mental

Health Report Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2524," attached to Addendum
to Presentence Report dated 7/14/2008; Sent. Tr., p.11, Ls.12-20; 6/19/08 Chg.
Plea Tr., p.7, Ls.6-13, p.8, Ls.10-13, p.14, L.23- p.15, L.4, p.21, Ls.5-8.

2

)

I.C. §

19-2524 does not contain any explicit requirements for the qualifications of the
persons conducting either the substance abuse assessment or mental health
examination described therein; therefore a challenge to the clinician from the
Department of Health and Welfare would be without any basis.

The district

court's conclusion that Morris did not raise the possibility of a valid claim is
therefore correct.
Morris appears to claim on appeal that I C. § 19-2522 requires that a
mental health evaluation conducted pursuant to LC. § 19-2524 comply with the
requirements for a psychological evaluation conducted pursuant to I.C. § 192522. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Because this conclusion is unsupported by

2

A Motion to Take Judicial Notice is being filed contemporaneously with this brief.

10

any argument or authority, Morris has waived this claim on appeal and the Court
should decline to consider it. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,
970 (1996).

More importantly, nothing in either statute gives rise to the

conclusion that the requirements for a psychological evaluation conducted
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 should be applied to a mental health evaluation
conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. To the contrary, the statutes make clear
that an evaluation conducted pursuant to I. C. § 19-2524 is not subject to the
more stringent requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.
First, I.C. § 19-2524 contains no explicit requirements for the qualifications
of the persons conducting either the substance abuse assessment or mental
health examination described therein.

Second, I.C. § 19-2524(3)(b) provides

that if, after receiving the ordered mental health evaluation, the court determines
that it requires more information, the court may then order a second evaluation,
this one "to be furnished by a psychiatrist, licensed physician or licensed
psychologist."

Finally, the language of I.C. § 19-2524(6) at least implicitly

indicates that the evaluations conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 may be
conducted by the Department of Health and Welfare, as the costs of any
assessments and examinations, "including any evaluation ... shall be borne by
the department."

In sum, the language of I.C. § 19-2524 contains no explicit

qualifications for the personnel conducting a mental health evaluation, and
contains language implying that that an evaluation conducted by a psychiatrist,
licensed physician or licensed psychologist is only required if the court orders
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additional evaluation after having considered the mental health examination
contemplated by I.C. § 19-2524.
Morris alleged no facts showing counsel performed deficiently for not
objecting because the evaluation was by a clinician instead of a psychiatrist or
psychologist.

He likewise presented no evidence that an evaluation by a

psychiatrist or psychologist instead of the clinician would have changed the
outcome of sentencing. Morris has therefore failed to show that he raised the
possibility of a valid claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that required
the assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. He has thus failed to
show that the district court erred when it denied his motion for the appointment of
counsel. This Court should affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing
Morris's petition for post-conviction relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of Morris's petition for post-conviction relief, including the district
court's order denying Morris's motion for post-conviction counsel.

DATED this 24th day of August, 201<

//
/
/ R e ekah A. Cude
(/
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24 day of August, 2011, I served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
SPENCERJ.HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defenders' basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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